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Abstract 
This paper is a reply to Richard Lauer’s “Is Social Ontology Prior to Social 
Scientific Methodology?” (2019) and an attempt to contribute to the meta-social 
ontological discourse more broadly. In the first part, I will give a rough sketch 
of Lauer’s general project and confront his pragmatist approach with a funda-
mental problem. The second part of my reply will provide a solution for this 
problem rooted in a philosophy of the social sciences in practice. 
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This is a reply to Richard Lauer’s paper “Is Social Ontology Prior to Social Scientific Methodol-
ogy?” which appeared in this journal in 2019.1 Lauer’s paper is a contribution to what can be 
called “meta-social ontology”. Meta-social ontology is an emerging field that – in line with its big 
sister meta-ontology (or “meta-metaphysics”, see the essays in Chalmers, Manley, & Wasserman, 
2009) – examines the purpose, the methods and the viability of different approaches to social 
ontology (see Kivinen & Piiroinen, 2006; Lohse, 2017; van Bouwel & Weber, 2008). Lauer’s meta-
ontological contribution (a) critically assesses mainstream realist approaches to social ontology 
that are science-directed in that they aim at improving research in the social sciences, and (b) 
presents a (possibly superior) alternative pragmatist approach to social ontology. 
In this reply to Lauer I will discuss both aspects of his paper and attempt to contribute to 
the meta-ontological discourse more broadly. In the first part, I will give a rough sketch of Lauer’s 
general project and confront the presented pragmatist approach with a fundamental problem. The 
second part of my reply will provide a solution for this problem via the vindication of the approach 
to social ontology developed in Lohse 2017, which Lauer discusses but (as I shall argue) miscon-
strues as realist. 
Pt. I: Lauer’s project 
Lauer’s paper is a valuable contribution to the discussion for at least two reasons. First, it 
connects recent work in general meta-metaphysics/meta-ontology, analytical ontology and the 
philosophy of the social sciences in a fruitful way. Second, it addresses an issue that (still) has not 
received enough attention, namely the viability of mainstream approaches to social ontology in 
relation to the social sciences. Lauer’s main target are what he calls “Ontology Matters!” (OM!) 
arguments, i.e. arguments that “support the claim that social ontology matters to the achievement 
of prediction and explanation in social science” (p. 3)2. Lauer draws on work going back to Carnap’s 
analysis of ontological questions and (correctly) points out that most OM! arguments are realist 
in a specific sense: They are based on the conviction that we need to “carve the social world at its 
joints” (p. 6) to promote success in the social sciences. To achieve this (according to the realists) 
we need to find out what there really is in the social world, i.e. what the right kind of ontological 
framework is, which can be done by deploying “characteristically philosophical (armchair) meth-
ods” (p. 2). Lauer’s prime examples for realist OM! approaches of this kind are Searle (1995, 2010) 
and Epstein (2015, 2016). As is well known, both think that social ontology is prior to social science 
research in the realist sense and that we need to build the social sciences on a better (i.e. 
1 I wish to thank Stefano Canali and Richard Lauer for constructive feedback on an earlier draft of this reply. 
2 Bare page numbers refer to Lauer’s paper.  
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Searle’s/Epstein’s) social ontology to facilitate progress in the social sciences in terms of successful 
explanations and predictions.3 
Lauer contrasts the realist approach with a pragmatist version of OM! where social ontol-
ogy does not aim at carving the social world at its joints but at introducing statements to the 
social sciences “that enable inferences to predictions and/or explanations, where before we might 
have lacked the ability to perform such inferences” (p. 13). The key move here is that the intro-
duced statements do not entail an ontological commitment to what there really is. They only serve 
the instrumentalist function of enabling epistemic operations in the social sciences that can be 
tested and revised. While Lauer does not argue for the pragmatist approach directly, he clearly 
thinks that it is superior to its alternative. The main reason he gives for this is that the pragmatist 
approach is more “economical”. It is useful for progress in the social sciences but does not rely on 
any kind of realism. Realism is not only a notoriously hard to defend position in the context of the 
social sciences. According to Lauer, it is also not clear on what basis we need to accept the realists’ 
assumption that “cutting the social world at its joints” is required for progress in the social sciences 
(pp. 3, 16).  
In my view, Lauer’s sceptical assessment of the viability of realist OM! arguments is on 
the right track, especially in light of additional problems for realist social ontologies that claim to 
be the foundations for research in the social sciences: How can we ever know what the ontology of 
the social world really is by relying on a priori reasoning and in light of the never-ending disputes 
in analytical ontology? And why should social scientists care what kinds of ontological frameworks 
are developed by philosophers? (Lohse, 2017, p. 13f). Unfortunately, the pragmatist approach 
presented by Lauer does not really provide a viable alternative for OM! arguments. This can be 
seen by considering the question of what is left to do under the heading of a pragmatist social 
ontology. According to Lauer, the only task left is to provide the social sciences with (potentially 
fruitful) statements that enable new explanations and predictions. But what would that really 
mean other than thinking of new assumptions to be tested in light of empirical evidence? It seems 
that this would not entail any kind of ontological reasoning (it is just what social scientist do in 
their day-to-day research).4 There is no analysis of the properties of social phenomena and their 
dependency relations, no uncovering of implicit ontological assumptions and no clarification of 
incoherent ontological assumptions in social science theories etc. There is just no discussion of 
ontological matters of any kind. If this is Lauer’s position, it collapses with radically anti-ontolog-
ical pragmatist positions that attempt to de-ontologize the entire debate and solely focus on 
                                         
3 Lauer also describes my approach to social ontology as realist, although of a more modest and ambiguous kind. 
The reason for this is that some of my statements do not seem to fit well with his characterization of realist 
OM! arguments. In part II of this paper, I will attempt to dissolve these ambiguities. 
4 The phrase ”ontological reasoning” (or “ontological investigation”) should not be understood in the restricted 
sense of “the study of things as they really are” here, of course, as this would be tantamount to the realists’ 
approach. My use of the phrase is more innocuous. It is meant to refer to all kinds of analyses of ontological 
aspects and assumptions of the sciences. In the next paragraphs, I will attempt to elucidate this concept of 
ontological investigations in the context of the social sciences. 
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operationalizable research questions and methodology (Kivinen & Piiroinen, 2006; Tsilipakos, 2012; 
van Bouwel, 2004; van Bouwel & Weber, 2008). 
 
 
Pt. II: Ontological investigations and philosophy of the social ssciences in practice 
As I have attempted to show in Lohse (2017), this is not the only available option though. 
We can aim for an alternative approach to social ontology that is pragmatist without giving up 
philosophical investigations that might be fruitful for the social sciences. To see this, it is useful to 
reconstruct Lauer’s analysis of my approach to social ontology and to resolve a number of misun-
derstandings along the way. Lauer is puzzled as to what my position really is (p. 5). On the one 
hand, I appear to be a proponent of realist OM! arguments as I argue for the thesis that substantial 
ontological investigations can be useful for the social sciences. I even claim that ontology needs to 
“extend beyond theories” (ibid.). On the other hand I criticize the analytical approaches of Searle, 
Epstein and others as well as their methodology. Apparently that puts me in the odd position that 
I want to move beyond social science theories and understand what really exists in the social world 
(in the “external” sense of the question), but without relying on the traditional approach of ana-
lytical ontology. This position does not seem to be coherent. 
Fortunately, the (apparent) incoherence of my position can be dissolved. Lauer is right to 
point out that my approach is highly critical of traditional approaches to social ontology – such 
as Searle’s and Epstein’s approach. However, Lauer misunderstands my demand to extend onto-
logical investigations “beyond theories”. He thinks that this statement reveals my commitment to 
a realist approach to social ontology that attempts to present a metaphysical picture of what there 
really is in social reality. This interpretation is missing my point though.5 My demand to extend 
beyond theories should rather be understood in light of the methodological stance I articulate in 
my paper, namely to understand ontology as part of a philosophy of science in practice. This kind 
of philosophy of science has been pioneered by Ian Hacking, Nancy Cartwright, Hasok Chang and 
others (see Soler et al., 2014 for an overview). It aims at paying close attention to developments 
in the actual sciences and attempts to refocus the philosophical analysis of the epistemic aspects 
of science. Instead of directing most of the attention at scientific theories and the relationship 
between theories and reality, philosophers of science in practice analyse scientific theories alongside 
epistemic practices, such as experimentation in the laboratory, explanatory modelling, and classi-
fication practices. This re-orientation introduces new kinds of questions to philosophy of science, 
which in turn suggest more naturalistic ways of answering them: How do the material aspects of 
the laboratory interact with experimental design? To what extent does big data research influence 
scientific classifications in biology? What are the implicit ontological assumption of explanatory 
network models in sociology? Answering questions like these requires a detailed analysis of scien-
tific practices (sometimes by deploying empirical social research methods) and opens up new ways 
                                         
5 Possibly, my incautious use of the phrase “beyond theories” misled Lauer here. It could be read as “over and 
above theories” in a metaphysical sense which was not what I had in mind. 
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of understanding the interplay of epistemic activities and scientific knowledge. In addition (and 
more to the point of this reply), tackling ontological questions such as the latter two enables us to 
gain a deeper understanding of factors that influence the different ways that scientists represent 
the structure of a specific domain (its classification), and of the sometimes hidden “ontological 
costs” (Peacock, 2011) of explanatory practices – i.e. the things (including their properties and 
relations) that need to be assumed to exists for a model to (actually) explain certain phenomena 
or processes. 
Understanding ontological investigations through the lens of a philosophy of the social sci-
ences in practice would likewise mean a re-orientation. It would amount to 
“the investigation of explicit and implicit ontological assumptions of theories and ex-
planatory frameworks, that is, the investigation of the ontological demands on the 
world presupposed by scientific theories, models, and related explanatory practices” 
(Lohse, 2017, p. 15). 
This conception is intended as a third way next to (a) realist ontological approaches that 
attempt to use armchair methods to uncover the true ontological basis of the social world as 
foundations for the social sciences, and (b) pragmatist approaches that aim for abandoning onto-
logical investigations tout court. Ontological investigation as part of a philosophy of the social 
sciences in practice are investigations that take seriously the ontological assumptions and implicit 
ontological commitments of the social sciences and their epistemic practices, including their less 
theory-based explanatory activities. It is this inclusion of epistemic practices that I have in mind 
when I demand to move beyond theories.  
Ontological investigations of this kind attempt to analyse and clarify basic assumptions 
concerning the social world that are presupposed not only by social theories, but also by different 
explanatory frameworks and explanatory practices (e.g. agent-based-modelling of social phenom-
ena). While this approach takes seriously the ontological assumptions and implicit commitments 
of the social sciences, this does not imply a realist commitment to the respective assumptions and 
commitments. In fact, the approach is open to the possibility of a plurality of incompatible social 
ontologies and is not wedded to the ideas that there is only one right way of conceptualizing the 
social world or that we can approximate a true conceptualization of the social world.6 Moreover, 
the approach is not in the business of building (better) social ontologies itself, although – as I will 
suggest below –  ontological investigations in line with a philosophy of the social sciences in practice 
may contribute to the integration of different social ontologies via conceptual clarification and 
immanent critique of theories and explanatory frameworks. 
This “third way” of doing ontology is nothing new. It has rather become one of the main-
stream options in the philosophies of the (empirical) special sciences. Philosophers of physics do 
not attempt to develop the ontological foundations of physics from scratch (this would be consid-
ered absurd). They aim for example to understand the ontological implications of different inter-
pretations of quantum physical experiments or the ontological status of dark matter as an element 
                                         
6 This may be the key difference between Daniel Little’s and my approach (see his paper in this issue of Philos-
ophy of the Social Sciences and Little 2009).  
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of the standard model of the universe. Likewise, (most) philosophers of the life sciences do not 
attempt to theorize about the nature of biological phenomena in the armchair. They rather analyse 
the ontological presuppositions and/or implications of different epistemic activities in the life sci-
ences. In many cases, these kinds of ontological investigations are not science-directed in the sense 
that they are not meant to be relevant for scientific success. But they can nevertheless be helpful 
for practicing scientist, and sometimes they are indeed intended to contribute to empirical success 
in the sciences (e.g. in the context of interdisciplinary research on the foundations of physics and 
cosmology). 
In the philosophy of the social sciences the analysis of the ontological assumptions of social 
scientific theories, models and epistemic practices is far from being a mainstream option. Most 
work in the philosophy of the social sciences is ontological in the sense of Epstein and Searle. It is, 
in other words, not really concerned with ontological aspects of the existing social sciences (the 
same applies to much of the ontological individualism/holism discourse in the philosophy of the 
social sciences). Alternatively, philosophers of the social sciences address (real) epistemological and 
methodological issues of the social sciences without any ontological focus.7 This is a peculiar situa-
tion for two reasons. First, many social scientists have been or are quite interested in ontological 
issues of their own disciplines (Marx, Bourdieu and Critical Realists, to name but a few). Second, 
many of the long-lasting disputes between different explanatory frameworks in the social sciences 
have an implicit or explicit ontological dimension. Bourdieu’s practice-theoretical framework, the 
explanatory framework in Analytical Sociology and Neo-Marxist approaches do not only have 
different epistemic aims and diverging methodological affinities (e.g. for micro- or macro-explana-
tions). They also entail different ontological assumptions regarding individual agents and social 
phenomena (e.g. distinct individual agents in Analytical Sociology vs. socially-constituted agents 
in Bourdieu’s framework). This fact can and should, I believe, motivate philosophers of the social 
sciences to investigate ontological aspects of their target disciplines along-side epistemological and 
methodological questions. For one thing, this would be an important contribution to the main 
descriptive task of the philosophy of the social sciences: to understand the social sciences, their 
specific features (such as their multiparadigmatic structure) and related aspects from an epistemic 
point of view. For another thing, this could also be a normative contribution that is fruitful for 
the social sciences. A critical comparative analysis of the ontological assumptions of different ex-
planatory frameworks could for example show that some of the prima facie deeply conflicting 
ontological assumptions in the social sciences turn out to be shallow – and hence: compatible – if 
reconstructed charitably and in light of the actual epistemic interests of social scientists (Lohse, 
2019).8 In this and similar cases, ontological investigations to not provide the basis for better 
explanations and predictions in the social sciences, but they help clarifying the actual ontological 
assumptions of different explanatory frameworks. This can support inner scientific discourse in the 
social sciences and foster “epistemic defragmentation”, which could contribute to scientific success 
in the long run – Ontology Matters! 
                                         
7 See Kincaid (2016) for an instructive exception to this.  
8 Such an analysis can, of course, benefit from the conceptual tools of analytical ontology, such as those used in 
the analysis of different types of ontological dependence relations (Tahko & Lowe, 2016). 
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In other cases, however, the analysis of ontological assumptions in the social sciences may 
indeed contribute to explanatory and/or predictive success, albeit in a more indirect way than 
suggested by Lauer. The case of organizational ecology can serve as an example for this claim here, 
since I already discussed it as an example in Lohse (2017: 16f), and since Lauer uses this discussion 
for the purposes of his paper (p. 14f). Organisational ecology aims to explain, amongst other things, 
why certain kinds of organizations survive better in different kinds of environments. For this pur-
pose they (e.g. Hannan & Freeman, 1989) rely heavily on Darwinian selection mechanisms on the 
population level as explanatory factors. In my paper, I refer to Reydon and Scholz (2009) who 
demonstrate that this explanatory practice is illusive because the proposed evolutionary selection 
mechanism can only work with populations that are able to evolve in a Darwinian sense – which 
organizational populations cannot. Lauer thinks that this critique is unhelpful: 
“Instead of concerning ourselves with whether there really are such populations, we 
may ask about the empirical merits of moving to a view of organizations that treats 
them as amenable to evolutionary styles of explanation” (p. 14). 
This instrumentalist response might work if we merely wanted to predict organizational 
behaviour. We could just ask then which assumptions generate the most successful predictions, 
without having to worry too much about the ontological adequacy of the respective assumptions. 
However, organizational ecologists are also interested in a Darwinian explanation of certain pat-
terns of organizational behaviour. It is this explanatory aim – to provide an evolutionary how-
actually explanation – that presupposes certain properties of the respective organizational popula-
tions. If we want to explain changes in organizational populations in terms of Darwinian selection 
mechanisms these populations need to be able to evolve in a Darwinian sense. Otherwise there is 
an ontological mismatch that makes a Darwinian explanation impossible. In this case, a conceptual 
analysis of the required ontological commitments of the explanatory framework in question con-
tributes to better explanatory practices in the social sciences – Ontology Matters! Note, that this 
does not imply any kind of realist commitment or presenting “a priori challenges” (p. 7) to social 
scientists. The outlined ontological critique of organizational ecology is entirely immanent to its 
explanatory project and is based on the ontological mismatch between populations of living things 
and organizations. 
There are many more cases, where the analysis and clarification of ontological assumptions 
and implicit commitments of social theories, frameworks and less theory-based explanatory prac-
tices may contribute to progress in the social sciences: An analysis of different taxonomies of social 
phenomena in different areas of the social sciences may contribute to cross-paradigm communica-
tion, the clarification of ontological ambiguities in mechanistic explanations may improve their 
explanatory force etc. (Lohse 2017: 18ff). This, however, would mean a radical shift away from 
analytical ontology and towards a methodology in line with a philosophy of the social sciences in 
practice. In my view, this approach to social ontology is pragmatist enough without giving up a 
distinctly philosophical perspective, a perspective that can have a clarifying impact on the social 
sciences.  
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